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Abstract
In Germany’s D-Grid project numerous Grid communi-
ties are working together to develop a common overarching
Grid. One major aim of D-Grid is thus to integrate the ex-
isting Grid deployments and make them interoperable. The
major challenge in this endeavor lies in the heterogeneity of
the current implementations: Three Grid middleware and
different VO management approaches have to be orches-
trated to achieve the intended interoperability. This paper
presents some of the findings of the IVOM project regarding
VO management technologies. Furthermore, options are
discussed for making Shibboleth federations and VO man-
agement systems interoperable so that attributes from both
sources can be used for authentication and authorization in
Grids. Finally two approaches, one using a so called ”trust
proxy” and one without trust proxying, are presented and
support by current Grid middleware is discussed.
1. Introduction
The D-Grid subproject Interoperability and Integration
of VO management Technologies in D-Grid (IVOM) [4]
aims at evaluating currently deployed VO management
technologies, assessing solutions developed by interna-
tional VO management projects and designing a D-Grid
wide VO management infrastructure based on these find-
ings as well as identifying remaining gaps.
Germany’s D-Grid initiative [3] consists of multiple
community Grids from different fields of science and differ-
ent industrial sectors. It is envisioned to use a common Grid
infrastructure shared by all these community Grids, similar
to using a common network, the internet. As a prerequisite,
it is necessary to ensure that these Grids are interoperable
among each other and, preferably, with international Grids
for comparable communities. One challenge lies in the fact
that the Globus Toolkit 4 [7], both in its web service and
its pre-WS flavor, different versions of LCG/gLite [16] and
UNICORE [17] are being used by German Grid communi-
ties. All of these have different authentication and autho-
rization schemes.
Furthermore, a Germany-wide Shibboleth [13] federa-
tion mainly for academic use is being build by Germany’s
National Research and Education Network (DFN) [5]. In-
formation about users stored in this federation can also be
used for authentication and authorization on Grid resources
as well as for VO management.
This paper first describes some challenges for authoriza-
tion in Grids and presents principle approaches for conquer-
ing these challenges. Then, two of several identified imple-
mentations of these approaches are presented and discussed.
Finally some related work is being presented and a conclu-
sion drawn.
2. Challenges for Authorization in Grids
2.1 Identity- and Attribute-based Autho-
rization
Many current authentication and authorization infras-
tructures (AAI) for Grids are using basic authorization
mechanisms based on the distinguished name (DN) of the
user’s X.509 certificate. As the grid security infrastruc-
ture (GSI) [8] is based upon X.509 proxy certificates de-
rived from X.509 user certificates the information about a
user’s DN is always available on Grid resources where the
user himself or other Grid services acting on his behalf need
to be authenticated and authorized. It was thus the obvious
choice not only to authenticate the user based on this infor-
mation but also to base authorization decisions on it as long
as no further attributes describing the user, his roles and af-
filiations, are available on the resource. One implication of
this authorization scheme is that the DNs of all users that
potentially have access to a resource must be contained in a
grid-mapfile and additionally a local account for each
of these users must be available. It is obvious that such a
solution is not very scalable for large amounts of users.
Attribute-based authorization needs at least two ad-
ditional components compared to the identity-based ap-
proach: First it needs an attribute authority (AA) which is-
sues such attributes in a trusted way and second it needs pol-
icy decision points (PDP) actually using these attributes for
authorization decisions (see also the work in OGF’s OGSA-
Authz-WG [1]).
This approach is more scalable than the identity-based
one, but at the current time it is widely deployed only by
gLite-based Grids and limited to the hierarchical model
of fully qualifies attribute names (FQAN), containing VO
membership, groups, roles and capabilities within that VO.
It does not allow for arbitrary attribute types such as nation-
ality or affiliation to a real organizational unit to be managed
or used for authorization.
2.2. Campus and VO Attributes
As we have identified a need for attribute-based autho-
rization on Grid resources the next question that arises is,
where these attributes are managed and who issues them in
a trustworthy way so that Grid components can make au-
thorization decisions based upon them. The first logical
source of attributes is a VO management system such as
VOMS [12] or myVocs [18]. These systems manage a list
of members of a VO and the users’ roles within that VO.
Additionally, there is another source of users’ attributes
which can also be used for authorization of users on Grid re-
sources: As Shibboleth federations emerge to make users’
attributes available across organizational boundaries, it is
the next logical step to make these attributes available to
Grid resources for both user management within Virtual
Organizations and for authorization purposes on Grid re-
sources. Such attributes can e.g. describe a user’s affiliation
to an institution or a project.
So there are now two attribute authorities instead of one:
In addition to the existing Virtual Organization manage-
ment systems there is the user’s Shibboleth identity provider
(IdP) at his home organization. These two attribute author-
ities issue different kinds of attributes:
Campus attributes are user attributes managed by their
respective home institution. They identify and describe the
user, e.g. by containing name, nationality or telephone num-
ber or his affiliation to organizational units and his roles
within these units (e.g. professor at a faculty or student of a
certain study course).
VO-Attributes describe membership, roles and capabil-
ities within a VO. In this paper we assume that these at-
tributes are managed by a dedicated VO management sys-
tem, e.g. based on VOMS (with or without VOMRS [20])
or myVocs.
2.3. Trust Issues
In Shibboleth, trust is based on the respective federation
policy and corresponding contracts between members and
the federation. In addition special arrangements may be
made between IdPs and Service Providers (SP). In practice,
trust is utilized when an IdP releases user attributes at the
request of a known SP and signs the assertion to confirm
the reliability of the information contained. In other words:
Information is requested, released and consumed in a bilat-
eral, trustful communication process. VO management in
Shibboleth as outlined above adds a third role to the pro-
cess.
The Shibboleth-based VO management systems avail-
able today intermediate the user’s IdP to a SP. This can be
done in two ways, which are fundamentally different re-
garding trust issues:
(i) The home IdP’s original assertion is transported to the
Grid resources alongside the attributes asserted by the VO,
thus preserving the different sources of authority.
(ii) The VO management service extracts the campus at-
tributes and includes them in its own assertion together with
the VO attributes. In this case the VO management service
acts as a trust proxy. Regarding trust and responsibility the
VO (or rather it’s operating institution) would also be held
accountable for the validity of campus attribute values.
The first solution has the advantage that the assertion the
user’s home IdP created is passed on unchanged and can be
evaluated independently. We see this as the best practice
currently feasible as all attributes will be issued and thus
signed by their responsible authority.
The second solution leads to a core problem in dis-
tributed systems: Who do you trust to say what about what
or whom? Here, the VO acts as if it were the authoritative
source also for attributes stemming from a campus IdP. We
consider this to be a bad practice and to be potentially dan-
gerous for each VO provider as well as for the trust fabric
of a federation in its entirety. As we will see later technical
issues will, under some circumstances, force us to neverthe-
less offer such an approach to the D-Grid communities if no
other solution is available.
3. Approaches for Combining Campus At-
tributes and VO Attributes in Grids
3.1 Prerequisites
The concepts presented in this paper rely on two main
premises:
First, campus attributes are made accessible by a Shib-
boleth federation, i.e. by providing a Shibboleth IdP at each
participating institution. In Germany the academic sector
is building such an infrastructure, the DFN-AAI led by the
German DFN Verein.
Second, VO management is done by using an appropri-
ate VO management tool. Regarding authentication and au-
thorization it is a basic requirement that the VO manage-
ment tool can effectively act as an attribute authority, i. e. it
can issue attributes in a trusted way.
Furthermore, the Grid middleware utilized must have
components that are able to verify and evaluate the attribute
assertions issued by the aforementioned attribute authorities
to be able to make authorization decisions based upon them.
3.2. Shibboleth and VO Management
Shibboleth’s federation model is two-tiered. The core
concept of Shibboleth-based authorization is to have a sin-
gle source of authority per user, which is the IdP, based
on the identity management at the user’s home institution.
A Service Provider requiring a user’s authentication and/or
making an authorization decision based on the user’s at-
tributes may only request that user’s attributes from a single
Identity Provider.
With the wide acceptance of Shibboleth it was adapted in
authentication and authorization realms outside the space of
inter-institutional sharing of web resources. One such field
is Grid AAI. The representation of Virtual Organizations in
Shibboleth is a major issue for the integration of Shibboleth
and Grid middleware. The ”Grid problem” – as the specific
challenge that underlies the Grid concept – has been iden-
tified as flexible, secure, coordinated resource sharing and
problem solving among dynamic collections of individuals,
institutions, referred to as Virtual Organizations (VO)[9].
A Virtual Organization is a source of authority of its own.
Users have specific roles in it and it confers specific rights
to users. So, to make a well-informed access control deci-
sion based on all available attributes of a user, a SP would
have to request attribute assertions from the home institu-
tion and the VO. The current Shibboleth architecture does
not support such attribute aggregation.
Therefore the additional source of authority had to fit
into the given model. Based on previous work by Von
Welch [22], the MAMS project [14] and the myVocs project
four options were identified to achieve this:
(i) VO management at the home institutions, based on
participant’s agreement on attributes, VO-specific informa-
tion is located at the member’s home institution. It is a
moot point if institutions would accept modifications in
their identity management systems. However, the major
problem is trust (see chapter Trust Issues below): the home
IdP is generally not the authoritative source for this infor-
mation.
(ii) The VO operates its own IdP including campus at-
tributes of the users. This means extra work to run separate
Identity Management (IdM) systems and services. This ap-
proach would undermine the advantages of the Shibboleth
concept of identity federation.
(iii) Decentralized VO management: VO attributes are
centrally managed by the VO and stored distributed in the
institutional IdM systems. The Internet2 tools Grouper and
Signet may be the appropriate provisioning tools in the fu-
ture. This approach would need a new set of trust relations
and associated policies, e.g. on attribute or namespace us-
age. A proof of concept is an open issue.
(iv) IdP Proxy: VO management hooks into the commu-
nication flow between IdP and SP by acting as a SP when
facing the IdP and acting as an IdP when facing the SP.
Thereby it gathers the user’s home attributes, adds the VO-
specific attributes and presents the resulting conglomerate
assertion to the SP. This is the solution chosen by the devel-
opers of myVocs and IAMSuite [15], the MAMS VO sys-
tem.
The management of Virtual Organizations was originally
not on the agenda of the Shibboleth architects. This is cur-
rently changing, as a discussion about linking multiple at-
tribute authorities has begun. It is especially encouraging
to see this being discussed with special attention to trust is-
sues [2]. This proposal about gathering attributes from a
number of IdPs is applicable to the question of integrating
VO management systems into the Shibboleth architecture.
3.3. Bridging Shibboleth and the GSI
GridShib [19] is a collection of software aimed at allow-
ing Grid resources to make authorization decisions based on
attributes managed by Shibboleth federations, i.e. by Shib-
  
 
                                                          
1
Features myVocs VOMRS/VOMS 
A. Profile 
1. Primary Grid ecosystem  Globus Toolkit 
GridShib 
gLite 
Globus Toolkit 
2. AAI base Shibboleth X.509 PKI 
3. Release state (April 2007) Beta Stable 
4. Software base Sympa VOMS 
5. Maintainer UAB INFN 
B. Interoperability with Grid Middleware 
1. Compatibility with GT2 
/GT4 pre-WS Services 
- - 
2. Compatibility with GT4 WS 
services with GridShib 
X X 
3. Compatibility with gLite - X 
4. Compatibility with Unicore5 - - 
5. Compatibility with Unicore6 X X 
6. Compatibility with GridShib X X 
D. Interoperability with Short Lived Credential Services 
1. Supports own SLCS (one  
SLCS per VO server) 
X - 
2. Supports central SLCS (e.g. 
EUGridPMA accredited 
DFN-SLCS ) 
X X 
E. Handling of IdP Assertions 
1. Attributes imported from IdP 
assertion to identify user 
eduPersonPrincipalName, 
mail 
n/a 
2. Additional attributes imported 
from IdP assertion 
all attributes released to 
myVocs by an IdP 
n/a 
3. Embedding of original IdP 
assertion in VO assertion 
- n/a 
F1. Issuing of VO Attributes: SAML Assertions 
1. Issuing of VO assertions X n/a 
2. Attributes used to represent 
VO membership 
ePPN, mail from eduPerson; 
a custom “group” attribute in 
the format role@vo 
n/a 
3. Additional attributes included 
in VO assertion 
- n/a 
 F2. Issuing of VO Attributes:  Attribute Certificates 
1. Support of Attribute 
Certificates 
n/a X 
2. Representation of VO 
membership 
n/a FQAN 
3. Additional attributes included n/a since VOMS 1.7: arbitrary 
Attribute-Value Pairs 
Table 1. VO Management Systems Compared
boleth IdPs, being developed as part of the Globus Project.
Furthermore it includes functionalities to enable users to ac-
cess Grid resources without the need for long-lived certifi-
cates issued by a certificate authority (CA). The four main
components of GridShib are:
GridShib for Globus: This component includes a Policy
Decision Point (PDP) for web service-based components of
the Globus Toolkit 4 such as WS-GRAM and RFT. This
PDP makes authorization decisions based on Shibboleth at-
tributes. It is not yet possible to make authorization de-
cisions solely based upon Shibboleth attributes: As there
is no concept in the Globus Toolkit similar to gLite’s pool-
accounts there is still need for a one-to-one mapping of Grid
identities to local accounts. This shortcoming will be solved
in the soon to be released Globus Toolkit 4.2.
GridShib for Shibboleth: This component has to be in-
stalled together with the Shibboleth federation’s IdPs if at-
tribute pull on the Grid resources is used. As we rely on
attribute push solely in this paper this component will not
be further considered.
GridShib CA: This component is a Shibboleth service
provider (SP) used to issue short lived certificates (SLC),
which users use instead of long-lived user certificates to ac-
cess GSI-based Grid resources. A service issuing SLCs is
called a short-lived certificate service (SLCS) or an online
CA.
GridShib SAML Tools: These tools can be used to re-
quest SAML assertions from a SAML Attribute Authority
(i.e. a Shibboleth IdP) and optionally bind them to X.509
proxy certificates. Using these tools it will be possible to
push attributes within such a proxy certificate to the Grid
resources. This solves the IdP discovery problem and elim-
inates the need to install the GridShib for Shibboleth soft-
ware on the IdPs. If installed together with a GridShib CA
the SAML tools can be used to embed a SAML assertion
directly into the issued short lived certificate.
3.4. VO Management Suites
In IVOM we evaluated several VO management projects
regarding their suitability for a VO management and
authentication and authorization infrastructure combining
Shibboleth-based campus attributes and self-managed VO
attributes. An overview over the results is given in table 1.
This table is part of a larger table including more features
and VO management systems available in our IVOM work-
ing package 1 report [10].
3.5. Authentication and Authorization
Without Trust-Proxying
As explained above, if trust proxying is not desired, the
Grid resources making authorization decisions based on
campus attributes must be able to consume and verify the
original attribute assertion by the user’s Shibboleth identity
provider. Three conditions must be met to allow for this:
(i) The campus attributes must be available on the Grid
resource. This means the attributes must be transported to
the resource in some way. In Grids using the GSI, a chain
of the user’s proxy certificates is available on all Grid re-
sources that received a request by or on behalf of the user.
A proxy certificate is an ideal container for extensions con-
taining attributes, as it is possible to push the attributes to
all resources without any need for additional services or
protocols. SAML assertions issued by Shibboleth identity
providers can be embedded into proxy certificates using the
GridShib SAML tools.
(ii) Upon successful transportation of the SAML asser-
tion containing the user’s attributes the Grid resource must
be able to verify the attribute assertion. This does not only
mean to cryptographically validate the identity provider’s
signature but also to verify that a particular identity provider
is the correct and responsible attribute authority for each at-
tribute contained in the SAML assertion, i.e. that the IdP
of institution A may not issue an attribute stating that a user
is member of some other institution B. To be able to exe-
cute this verification process, the Grid resource needs the
X.509 certificates of all identity providers together with the
information about the scope of attributes for each IdP. This
information is part of the Shibboleth federation’s metadata,
but not necessarily available on all Grid resources unless
they are registered service providers of the Shibboleth fed-
eration.
(iii) The Grid resource must have a policy decision point
capable of consuming the just received and verified at-
tributes, i.e. in the case of campus attributes issued by a
Shibboleth IdP SAML assertions.
3.6. Authentication and Authorization
With Trust-Proxying
Doubts about sound principles put aside, the major ad-
vantage of using a trust proxy is that the Grid resources do
not need to know all Shibboleth identity providers. Com-
pared to the last section condition two is greatly simplified:
Grid resources only need to know the entity acting as a trust
proxy as this entity uses its private key to sign all campus at-
tributes relayed through it. So the Grid resources only need
exactly one X.509 certificate, that one belonging to the trust
proxy, to validate pushed campus attributes.
If no policy decision point is available for SAML asser-
tions, using a trust proxy can also solve that problem: As
the attributes are re-signed anyway, the trust proxy can is-
sue the attributes in a different container.
4. Example Workflows
4.1. Middleware Support
As already noted, Grid middleware must support valida-
tion and evaluation of the attributes contained in an attribute
assertion. We currently have two types of attribute asser-
tions: SAML assertions and Attribute Certificates. They
are supported by the following Grid middleware:
SAML-Assertions: GridShib adds support for SAML as-
sertions to the Globus Toolkit 4. UNICORE5 and gLite do
not support SAML assertions. UNICORE is currently ex-
tended as part of the IVOM project to support SAML asser-
tions coming from the IdP of a UNICORE user. The devel-
opment includes an interface to GridShib delivering short
lived certificates (SLC) and the modification of the UNI-
CORE user database (UUDB), which is modified to extract
assertions from the certificates and to act as a PDP.
Client
GridShib CA
with SAML Tools
Shibboleth WAYF Shibboleth IdP
Certificate 
with Campus 
attributes 
(SAML) 
issued by 
IdP 
(6)
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(AC) issued 
by VOMS
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Figure 1. A workflow using VOMS without
Trust Proxying
Attribute Certificates: a VOMS-PDP consuming At-
tribute Certificates is available as a technical preview for
the Globus Toolkit, UNICORE will support Attribute Cer-
tificates. gLite does support Attribute Certificates, but only
newer versions of the corresponding components do sup-
port generic attribute-value pairs instead of the hierarchic,
fully qualified attribute names. Both versions of UNICORE
currently do not support Attribute Certificates. As part of
IVOM UNICORE is extended allowing the generation of
Attribute Certificates from a users X.509 certificate using
the VOMS voms-proxy-init. The UUDB is modified
to extract the attributes from the certificates and acts as a
PDP.
4.2. Using VOMRS/VOMS for VO Man-
agement Without Trust Proxying
gLite’s Virtual Organization Membership Service
(VOMS) [12] is a system for managing members of VOs. It
features a database backend for storing the users and their
attributes. It can store VO-membership attributes as well
as Group, Role and Capability attributes used by gLite’s
Local Centre Authorization Service (LCAS) mechanism
for authorization decisions. It is being accessed for VO
management purposes using a Web front-end for both
users to register themselves and for VO-Administrators to
manage the VO-members. VOMS issues its attributes as
Attribute Certificates which are commonly included into
proxy certificates.
In D-Grid VOMS is used in conjunction with VOMRS
for its currently more comprehensive set of features for VO
administration. VOMRS itself however cannot issue any
kind of attribute assertion, but it is capable of synchronizing
into a VOMS database so that the attached VOMS can be
used for issuing Attribute Certificates.
In Fig. 1 a typical workflow for a session of a Grid user
without a long lived certificate for a VOMS-based Grid is
depicted. In this case, VOMS is not used as a trust proxy,
but the original SAML assertion of the user’s home organi-
zation’s IdP is preserved.
In step 1 the user contacts the online CA, in this case
a GridShib CA, in order to obtain a short lived certificate.
Steps 2 to 4 are a standard Shibboleth authentication and
authorization procedure. Additionally, in step 4, the user’s
campus attributes are transferred from the IdP to the Grid-
Shib CA in form of a SAML assertion. The GridShib CA
now embeds, using GridShib’s SAML tools, this assertion
in unaltered form into the certificate it issues in step 5. This
means that the user now (step 6) owns a short lived cer-
tificate which already includes his campus attributes as an
X.509 extension encoded as a SAML assertion.
In step 7 the user requests his VO attributes from the
VOMS service, e.g. by using the voms-proxy-init
command. In step 8 the VOMS service issues an Attribute
Certificate containing these attributes which are embedded
into a proxy certificate derived from the short lived certifi-
cate obtained from the GridShib CA. Now (step 9), the user
has a proxy credential containing both, the short lived cer-
tificate containing his campus attributes and a proxy certifi-
cate derived from it containing his VO attributes.
The user can now access GSI-based Grid components
using standard tools such as globusrun-ws in case of
Globus Toolkit 4 (steps 10 and 11).
The advantages of using VOMS for VO management
are its maturity and ongoing development. Initially, VOMS
did not support arbitrary attribute-value pairs as Shibboleth
does, instead it used a hierarchic model of Fully Qualified
Attribute Names (FQAN). Current releases do already sup-
port generic attribute-value pairs and for future releases it
is planned to be able to issue attributes in form of SAML
assertions like Shibboleth. Currently VOMS only supports
Attribute Certificates for issuing attributes.
4.3. Using myVocs for VO management
With Trust Proxying
myVocs’ design goal was to ”extend the access to emerg-
ing Internet collaboration tools and build a system environ-
ment that respects VO defined roles and attributes while pre-
serving valuable institutional identity assertions”. myVocs
thus manages attributes. It actually is a SAML-based Iden-
tity Provider proxy serving as a bridge between a federation
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Figure 2. A workflow using myVocs with Trust
Proxying
of Shibboleth Identity Providers and a federation of Shib-
boleth Service Providers for overcoming the somewhat un-
realistic expectation that home organizations maintain their
VO list of users. myVocs presents itself as a Shibboleth
SP so that other services can rely on it to ensure that the
user has been authenticated. The myVocs servers assert the
attributes that the SPs in the VO need to base their autho-
rization decisions upon.
In Fig. 2 a typical workflow for a session of a Grid user
without a long lived certificate for a myVocs-based Grid is
depicted. In this case, myVocs is used as a trust proxy. In
step 1 the user requests a short lived certificate from an on-
line CA, in this case the GridShib CA. Steps 2 to 4 are a
standard Shibboleth authentication and authorization pro-
cedure. If the user is successfully authenticated and autho-
rized the GridShib CA issues a short lived certificate and
returns it to the user. As trust proxying is being used in
this scenario, the issued certificate does not include any at-
tributes yet (step 6).
In step 7 the user queries the myVocs service and is
again, in steps 8 to 10, authenticated and authorized us-
ing Shibboleth. Furthermore, in step 10, attributes are re-
leased from the user’s home organization’s IdP to myVocs.
If successfully authenticated and authorized, myVocs issues
a SAML assertion in step 11 containing both, the user’s
campus attributes obtained in step 10 and his VO attributes
managed by myVocs itself. In step 12 the user can now em-
bed this SAML assertion to a proxy certificate derived from
the short lived certificate obtained in step 5.
In step 13 the user accesses GSI-based Grid resources
using standard tools such as globusrun-ws in case of
Globus Toolkit 4.
A user with a long-lived standard X.509 user certificate
simply starts with step seven as he does not need to acquire
a short lived certificate. Still, he needs to be member of
some Shibboleth IdP of a supported federation as he needs
to authenticate to myVocs.
myVocs allows several SPs (called VO SPs) to be ag-
gregated into Virtual Organizations (VOs). myVocs consid-
ers VOs as people (more precisely: collections of attributes
of people represented by lists), and the aggregated SPs as
federated sets of distributed applications, the resources, ac-
cessible by this list of people. It is an important feature of
myVocs that a single VO SP may serve multiple VOs and,
hence, is supporting overlapping VOs. Like the IdPs, the
VO SPs may reside in arbitrary administrative domains. Us-
ing off-the-shelf, open source software components (such
as Shibboleth, MySQL, and Sympa), myVocs provides the
”glue” that authorizes access to a VO SP based on the mem-
bership in some specific VO. The resources are protected by
VO SPs which are mutually trusted by a VO IdP.
4.4. Comparison
As can be seen from Table 1, support for attribute-based
authorization decisions in current Grid middleware is still
limited. First of all it has to be noted that without a policy
decision point able to validate and consume SAML asser-
tions it is not possible to use campus attributes without trust
proxying. As Shibboleth IdPs are only able to issue attribute
assertions as SAML and any translation of these assertions
in any other format would invalidate the IdP’s signature
these assertions need to be passed unaltered to the resource
making the authorization decision. Currently SAML PDPs
are avalilable for the Globus Toolkit as part of GridShib and
this will presumably be part of Globus 4.2 to be released
later this year. As myVocs also issues SAML assertions it
will also be a supported VO management tool for SAML-
compatible middleware regarding attribute-based authoriza-
tion.
Attribute certificates as issued by VOMS containing
generic attribute-value pairs are supported by gLite com-
ponents using a version of LCAS/LCMAPS (Local Creden-
tial Mapping Service) currently being tested, a PDP for the
Globus Toolkit 4 exists as a technology preview and UNI-
CORE will also contain a VOMS-PDP.
In summary, the approaches using no trust proxy will
in the short term only be available for UNICORE and the
Globus Toolkit as there is no SAML-PDP currently avail-
able for gLite.
Based on these findings we have identified several cur-
rently available possible approaches for Shibboleth-enabled
VO management. Two of them supported by the Globus
Toolkit 4 and UNICORE are presented here: The first ap-
proach ist based on VOMS without trust proxying for Grid
communities which do not want to rely on trust proxying.
The SAML assertion containing the campus attributes has
to be embedded into a proxy certificate by the user or into
a short lived credential by the GridShib CA, both using the
GridShib SAML tools. The VOMS will issue Attribute Cer-
tificates VO-attributes.
The second approach is based on myVocs as a trust proxy
issuing SAML assertions containing both, campus-and VO-
attributes. This approach will be supported by two Grid
middleware in the mid-term, namely the Globus Toolkit 4
and UNICORE. This approach directly supports Grids be-
ing accessed by a web portal that is a standard Shibbo-
leth service provider within the VO where the IdP part of
myVocs is being used for authentication and authorization
of Grid users.
5. Related Work
Some promising related work regarding trust proxying
using VOMS is done by SWITCH as part of EGEE: The
Shibboleth Interoperability with Attribute Retrieval through
VOMS (VASH)[6] project aims at user-initiated transfers of
Shibboleth attributes to a VOMS service. The VOMS ser-
vice then issues these attributes together with VO attributes.
At its current stage it is not evaluated whether the campus
attributes stored within the VOMS are still valid, but in fu-
ture releases this problem is going to be addressed by the
developers. If the validity of the issued attributes can be ver-
ified upon issuing them as trust proxy, this approach will be
reconsidered by the IVOM project for use in D-Grid. How-
ever, we cannot stress enough that we consider trust prox-
ying in any way as a interim solution until it is possible to
validate and consume original campus attribute assertions
on all Grid resources.
Another work concerned with trust proxying is [11],
where an approach using a central GridShib CA together
with VOMS is presented. In this approach, the GridShib
CA acts as a trust proxy, re-issuing the original SAML as-
sertion within the issued short lived credential. This ap-
proach ensures that not all IdPs need to be known to the
Grid resources but it requires both, SAML and Attribute
Certificate support, to be available on the Grid resources.
A solution extending UNICORE6 for supporting SAML
assertions is currently under development in the OMII-
Europe project. The developments include both enhance-
ments of UNICORE6 and a version of VOMS supporting
SAML assertions [21].
6. Conclusion
In this paper we described the aim of the IVOM Project,
presented some of its findings and identified several solu-
tions for the imminent challenges. Special focus is hereby
on trust issues caused by the combination of campus at-
tributes managed by a Shibboleth federation and VO at-
tributes managed by a VO management system. Hereby
we ensure interoperability in two directions: First, between
Shibboleth federations and VO management systems and
second between the three different Grid middleware used
by D-Grid communities.
Currently, almost all solutions discussed appear to have
weaknesses with respect to proper handling of trust issues
or are not (yet) in a status lending itself to fast deployment.
Future versions of SAML/Shibboleth as well as implemen-
tations of PDPs for all Grid middleware components for all
necessary types of attribute assertions will address these is-
sues. Trust proxying with all its implications may then not
be needed any more. Meanwhile, any intermediate solution
must also address the need of attribute consumers in Grids
to recognize two chains of trust: The chain originating from
the GridPMAs - as usual - and in addition the one of (na-
tional) Shibboleth federations. Also, either the Grid-service
providers or their proxies must become partners in the ap-
propriate federation - or attributes should not be delivered to
them. If information present in VO membership, roles, etc.
is to be used in other than Grid SPs, a proper (intermedi-
ate) contractual relation to the federation, fitting its policy,
either as IdP or SP, must be found as well.
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